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Abstract
Demonstrability—the extent to which group members can recognize a correct solution to a
problem—has a significant effect on group performance. However, the interplay between
group size, demonstrability and performance is not well understood. This paper addresses
these gaps by studying the joint effect of two factors—the difficulty of solving a problem and
the difficulty of verifying the correctness of a solution—on the ability of groups of varying
sizes to converge to correct solutions. Our empirical investigations use problem instances
from different computational complexity classes, NP-Complete (NPC) and PSPACE-com-
plete (PSC), that exhibit similar solution difficulty but differ in verification difficulty. Our study
focuses on nominal groups to isolate the effect of problem complexity on performance. We
show that NPC problems have higher demonstrability than PSC problems: participants were
significantly more likely to recognize correct and incorrect solutions for NPC problems than
for PSC problems. We further show that increasing the group size can actually decrease
group performance for some problems of low demonstrability. We analytically derive the
boundary that distinguishes these problems from others for which group performance mono-
tonically improves with group size. These findings increase our understanding of the mecha-
nisms that underlie group problem-solving processes, and can inform the design of systems
and processes that would better facilitate collective decision-making.
Introduction
A body of social science research has shown the effect of the demonstrability of a problem on a
group’s ability to collectively solve intellective problems [1, 2]. A problem is considered to be
of high demonstrability if group members who failed to solve the problem are still likely to
recognize correct solutions proposed by others. According to the “truth-wins” process [1, 3],
when solving problems of high demonstrability, groups are likely to converge to a correct
solution as long as there is at least one group member who is able to solve the problem. In con-
trast, for problems of low demonstrability, members who were not able to correctly solve the
problem may not be able to recognize solutions proposed by those who did; thus, the majority
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of the group might not converge to a correct solution, and the “truth-wins” process does not
apply [4].
Prior research also looked at the effect of group size on group performance. Laughlin et al.
[4] showed that groups of size three can outperform individual participants in intellective tasks
involving arithmetic logic, and Carey and Laughlin [2] demonstrated the superiority of groups
over the best individuals when solving coding problems from letters to numbers. Yetton &
Bottger [5] showed that the marginal benefit from additional group members reduces with
group size for both interacting and nominal groups and that the benefit from additional
members depends on their abilities. the conditions under which increasing group size would
improve or decrease group performance have not been formalized.
We address this gap by studying the joint effect of demonstrability and group size on group
performance. We formalize the intuitive notion of demonstrability by drawing on computa-
tional complexity theory [6]. Specifically, computational complexity considers two factors: (1)
solution complexity, how the computational resources required to solve a given problem grow
with problem size, and (2) verification complexity, how the computational resources required
to verify the correctness of a given solution to the problem grows with problem size.
To isolate the effect of the computational complexity of the problem itself on group perfor-
mance from other aspects that have been shown to affect group performance (e.g., social
dynamics in the group), we study nominal (non-interacting) groups. This enables us to under-
stand the computational limitations each individual carries in group interactions. We show
through empirical studies and analytical derivations that group performance—and in particu-
lar, the effect of group size on performance—depends on both solution and verification com-
plexity. Notably, we show that for problems of particularly low demonstrability, increasing
group size can be detrimental to group performance.
We focus on intellective problems with complete information, which require at least some
computation and for which there is a ground truth and solutions can be verified for correct-
ness. We distinguish such tasks from judgment tasks where there might not be sufficient infor-
mation to determine the ground truth during the group’s decision-making process (e.g., a
jury’s decision), and quantitative assessment tasks, such as the famous task of assessing the
weight of an ox [7], where statistical convergence to the mean makes a larger number of team
members beneficial (i.e., the wizdom-of-the-crowd phenomena).
Within the broad category of intellective tasks, we studied two types of problems that are
computationally hard, in the sense that the number of possible solutions to consider grows
exponentially with problem size. However, they differ in the amount of computation required
to verify solutions, hence they should exhibit different levels of demonstrability [8]. The first
problem type belongs to the NP-Complete (NPC) computational complexity class, for which
solutions can be verified in polynomial time (with respect to the size of the problem). The sec-
ond problem type belongs to the PSPACE-Complete (PSC) computational complexity class,
for which verifying solutions requires exponential time [6]. Amir et al. [8] provided prelimi-
nary evidence regarding the relationship between demonstrability and computational com-
plexity. We extend their study in the following ways. First, by showing that for some problems
of low demonstrability, groups may fail to converge to the correct solution. Second, by deriv-
ing the boundary that distinguishes these problems from others for which group performance
monotonically improves with group size. Third, by providing a new empirical design for show-
ing the effects of demonstrability on performance.
We used a nominal group setting in which participants first solved a problem on their
own and were then presented with solutions proposed by other group members. We say that
a participant is a solver (S) of a given problem if the participant was able to solve the problem
in a predesignated amount of time (and conversely for a non-solver (NS)). A participant has
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recognized a given solution to the problem if the participant was able to accept the solution if it
is correct (AC), or reject the solution if it is wrong (RW).
Intuitively, solvers would also be more likely to accept correct solutions (and reject wrong
solutions) than non-solvers (i.e., P(AC j S)> P(AC j NS) and P(RW j S)> P(RW j NS)). There-
fore, the probabilities of accepting a correct solution and rejecting a wrong solution by a group
member (shown in Eq 1) depend on whether the member was able to solve the problem or
not, which occurs with probability P(S) and P(NS) respectively.
PðACÞ ¼ PðAC j SÞ  PðSÞ þ PðAC j NSÞ  PðNSÞ
PðRW Þ ¼ PðRW j SÞ  PðSÞ þ PðRW j NSÞ  PðNSÞ
ð1Þ
We define group convergence (GC) as the event by which the majority of the group chooses
the correct solution. A necessary and sufficient condition for GC requires that
• A correct solution exists (ECS) in the set of solutions generated by N group members (at least
one of the members was able to solve the problem). P(ECS) = 1 − (1 − P(S))N
• Amajority of the group accepts a correct solution, given that one exists, and a majority rejects
wrong solutions.
PðGC j ECSÞ ¼
X
j>N=2
N
j

PðACÞj  ð1   PðACÞÞN  j
X
j>N=2
N
j

PðRW Þj  ð1   PðRW ÞÞN  j
ð2Þ
We posit that NPC problems exhibit high demonstrability due to their easy-to-verify nature
(and conversely for PSC problems). Accordingly, we formulate the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The probability of a non-solver accepting a correct solution (and rejecting a
wrong solution) will be higher for NPC problems than for PSC problems:
PNPCðAC j NSÞ > PPSCðAC j NSÞ;PNPCðRW j NSÞ > PPSCðRW j NSÞ ð3Þ
Hypothesis 2: Increasing the group size for NPC problems will improve group perfor-
mance (i.e., facilitate convergence to the correct solution) because non-solvers will be able to
recognize a correct solution when it is presented to them.
limn!1PNPCðGCÞ ! 1 ð4Þ
(Note that the term P(ECS) converges to 1 for both problem classes so we can replace
P(GC j ECS) with P(GC).)
In contrast, increasing group size for PSC problems may be detrimental to group perfor-
mance, because non-solvers might not recognize the correct solution. That is, for at least some
PSC type problems, we expect the following to hold:
limn!1PPSCðGCÞ ! 0 ð5Þ
For the NPC class, we used the traveling salesman problem (TSP), which requires the solver
to form a closed loop through the graph that visits each node exactly once. For the PSC com-
plexity class, we used a strategic game called Geography (GEO), in which players traverse a
path on the graph by selecting a node at each turn, starting from an initial node. The first
player to reach a node which does not have outgoing edges, or only has outgoing edges to
nodes that were previously chosen (a.k.a “sink”) loses the game. For both problems, we
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generated an easy instance (denoted TSP-E and GEO-E respectively) and a hard instance
(denoted TSP-H and GEO-H respectively). Fig 1 (top) shows a visualization of a possible solu-
tion to the TSP-H problem with a solution emanating from the node labeled 29 and terminat-
ing with the node labeled 47 having traversed the entire graph with no cycles. Fig 1 (bottom)
shows the GEO-H problem instance in which the green player is positioned at node 26 and is
asked to choose the next node which will guarantee a win over the blue player.
The Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the Department of Software and Information Sys-
tems Engineering at Ben-Gurion University approved the described experiments. All the par-
ticipants provided their informed consent to participate in the study.
Fig 1. Screen-shots of the TSP-H (top) and GEO-H (bottom) problem instances.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0192213.g001
The more the merrier?
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Participants in online experiments (N = 296) were assigned to one of four conditions, vary-
ing the type of the problem (TSP or GEO) and the difficulty of solving the problem (Hard or
Easy). Participants first solved the problem individually and submitted their solutions. They
were then presented with three possible solutions to the problem: a correct solution, a wrong
solution, and their own solution. For each of the solutions, participants were asked to accept
the solution as correct, or reject the solution as incorrect.
Results
Table 1 shows the number of participants and the proportion of participants (P(S)) who solved
the hard problems TSP-H and GEO-H. These two problems exhibited similar P(S) values of
0.173 and 0.188 respectively (χ2(1) = 0.00036, p = 0.9848). Thus, the empirical difficulty of
solving the two types of problems was similar. There was also no significant difference in the
empirical difficulty of solving the easy problems TSP-E and GEO-E (see Fig B in S1 File).
Fig 2 shows non-solvers’ ability to recognize solutions for TSP-H and GEO-H problems. As
shown in the figure, 88% of non-solvers (out of 69) accepted a correct solution for the TSP-H
problem, compared to 36% (out of 57) for the GEO-H problem. Similarly, 94% of non-solvers
Table 1. Number of subjects and P(S) measures for GEO-H and TSP-H problems.
TSP-H GEO-H
num. 85 69
P(S) 0.18 0.17
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0192213.t001
Fig 2. Non-Solvers’ acceptance and rejection of solutions for TSP-H (an NPC-type problem) and for GEO-H (a PSC-type problem).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0192213.g002
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rejected a wrong solution for the TSP-H problem, compared to 45% for the GEO-H problem.
All differences were statistically significant (χ2(1) > 34.285, p< 0.001). The results for the
TSP-E and GEO-E problems were similar, supporting Hypothesis 1. We validated our results
by repeating the experiment in laboratory settings (N = 55) (see Tables C and D in S1 File.)
To test Hypothesis 2, we ran simulations of group performance (GC) for different group
sizes. We used the experimentally obtained values (P(S), P(AC), P(RW)) for the TSP-H prob-
lem (Fig 3(A)) and GEO-H problem (Fig 3(B)). For both problems, P(ECS) (the likelihood that
a solution is generated by at least one participant, shown by the blue line) quickly increases
with group size. However, for the TSP-H problem, P(GC) (group performance, shown by the
red line) converges with P(ECS), whereas for the GEO-H problem, despite the increase of
P(ECS) with group size, the group performance decays when N> 12 due to the inability of
group members to recognize correct solutions (Fig 3(B)). These results support Hypothesis 2.
The empirical results and simulations supporting Hypothesis 2 show that for problems of
particularly low demonstrability (such as hard PSC problems), increasing group size beyond a
certain finite number is detrimental to group performance. Intuitively, the reason for this det-
rimental effect is that the benefit of adding group members is marginally decreasing, because
at some point the likelihood of having at least one group member who correctly solves the
problem converges to 1, and beyond this point adding more group members is no longer ben-
eficial. At the same time, increasing the group size monotonically decreases the likelihood that
a majority of group members will accept the correct solution and reject the wrong solutions.
Therefore, beyond a certain optimal finite group size, this negative effect will outweigh the pos-
itive effect of increasing the likelihood of generating a correct solution.
Next, we generalize this result by characterizing the phase transition between two types
of problems: problems for which increasing group size monotonically improves perfor-
mance, and problems for which performance peaks at a finite optimal group size and decays
thereafter.
In this analysis, we assume for simplicity that solvers can always correctly verify other
wrong/correct solutions (i.e., P(AC j S) = P(RW j S) = 1)) and that for a non-solver, the
likelihoods of verifying a correct solution and verifying a wrong solution are equal (i.e.,
P(AC j NS) = P(RW j NS)). We can now use a single term, P(VC), to denote the likelihood that
a given solution was verified correctly as right or wrong (where P(VC) = P(AC) = P(RW)).
Numerical simulation and separatrix boundary
Using numerical simulations for different parameter values of P(S) and P(VC j NS), we found
two different phases of group behavior, a region where performance improves monotonically
with group size (Fig 4(A), blue region) and a region where increasing group size decreases per-
formance after a peak at a finite group size (Fig 4(A), orange region). Fig 4(B) and Fig 4(C)
show the group performance for example problem instances that lie in the different regions.
We derive the separatrix between the two phases analytically. We model group convergence
as a binomial process, where each group member succeeds in recognizing the correct solution
with a probability of P(VC) (similar to the process described by Eq 2). Adding a group member
results in an additional trial to this process. If P(VC)> 0.5, the additional group member is
more likely to verify solutions correctly than not, thus increasing the overall likelihood that the
group will converge to the correct solution. If, however, P(VC)< 0.5, the additional group
member is less likely to verify solutions correctly than not, and therefore adding this group
member decreases the overall likelihood that the group will converge to the correct solution.
This process is analogous to the tossing a biased coin: if the coin is biased in favor of getting
“heads”, increasing the number of coin tosses increases the likelihood of obtaining a majority
The more the merrier?
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Fig 3. The probability of the group converging to the correct solution, P(GC) (red curve), and of at least one group member solving the
problem, P(ECS) (blue curve), given the number of group members, for TSP-H problem (an NPC-type problem) and for the GEO-H
problem (a PSC-type problem). For TSP-H, P(GC) monotonically increases as P(ECS) increases, ultimately converging to 1. In contrast, for
GEO-H, P(GC) initially increases (due to the increase in P(ECS)), but reaches a peak at N = 12 and then decreases as a result of participants’
inability to correctly verify solutions.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0192213.g003
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of “heads”. We can therefore compute for each P(S) the minimal value of P(VC) such that
increasing N will always increase P(GC j ECS), by requiring that P(VC)> 0.5. To obtain
P(VC)> 0.5, we have
1  PðSÞ þ PðVC j NSÞ  ð1   PðSÞÞ > 0:5
PðVC j NSÞ >
0:5   PðSÞ
1   PðSÞ
ð6Þ
Fig 4(D) shows the separatrix boundary on a log-log scale based on the analytical derivation of
Eq 6. The points on the separatrix boundary in the figure are computed by simulation and
Fig 4. (A) Numerical simulations show two phases of performance depending on group size. The first phase describes groups whose performance
increases monotonically with the number of group members (blue). The second phase (orange) describes groups whose performance reaches a
maximum at a finite group size and decays thereafter. (B) Group performance (P(GC)) increases monotonically with increasing group size (P(S) = 0.4,
P(VC j NS) = 0.3). P(GC) approaches 1 as N!1; (C) Group performance (P(GC)) reaches a peak at a finite group size (N = 9) and decays for
increasing group size, for a particular set of problem parameters (P(S) = 0.1, P(VC j NS) = 0.4). P(GC) approaches 0 as N!1. (D) The separatrix
between the two phases follows a simple analytic relation: PðVC j NSÞ ¼ 0:5  PðSÞ
1  PðSÞ . The points on the separatrix line are computed by simulation and align
with this analysis.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0192213.g004
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coincide with the equation. The problems from our empirical problems fall in different regions
of this space. The NPC type problems (TSP-H, TSP-E) fall within region B (in blue) whereas
the PSC type problems (Geo-H, GEO-E) fall within region C (in orange). The Supplementary
Information also includes analysis of the optimal group size for problems within this region
(Fig B in S1 File).
Discussion and conclusion
The results of our study contribute to the literature on group decision making regarding strate-
gic/combinatorial problems. They relate to the ongoing debate as to when groups are better
than individuals, and demonstrate that the nature of the problem to be solved might be as
important as the characteristics of the group members attempting to solve it. Groups have
been shown to outperform individuals in lab settings [4, 9, 10] and in certain prediction and
estimation tasks, typically involving a relatively straightforward quantitative judgment (the
“wisdom of the crowd” effect [7, 11, 12]). In another study of quantitative judgment tasks, it
has been shown that the improved performance of groups can sometimes be attributed to
learning that occurs in individuals as a result of group discussions [13]. Our results show that
large groups might not be preferable when solving more complex problems which are charac-
terized by low demonstrability. On the other hand, many studies have documented that certain
dynamics (polarization, free-riding and “groupthink”) may seriously inhibit the group’s overall
performance [14–20], and that coordination costs further inhibit performance as the team gets
larger [21].
Our work complements these previous studies which describe deleterious effects of small
group dynamics. Our results underline the important role of problem complexity in group
processes, even before considering the different personal dynamics such a group may display.
We show that in addition to potential detrimental effects of social dynamics on group perfor-
mance, there are also detrimental effects stemming from the difficulty individuals have in
assessing the correctness of proposed solutions.
Regarding the study’s limitations, we have based our model and empirical studies on non-
interacting (nominal) groups, which is distinct from situations in which groups solve problems
together [9, 22–24]. Studying nominal groups enabled us to focus on the inherent characteris-
tics of the problem and their effects on group performance, eliminating factors related to group
dynamics. We note that such groups are becoming prevalent in online communities such as
crowdsourcing platforms and citizen science [25, 26].
Second, in our study each participant was presented with a single wrong solution. In gen-
eral, there could be many wrong solutions, and our formula P(RW) can easily be extended
by adding similar elements for each of these wrong options. Having multiple wrong solu-
tions will actually make group convergence more difficult for PSC problem types, because
solvers can be led astray by more options. In this respect, the likelihood of convergence for
PSC problems shown in Fig 4, when there is just one wrong solution, represents an upper
bound.
To summarize, our results show that the benefit from increasing the group size (P(ECS)
increases with N) can be offset by the fact that its members may not recognize correct solutions
(P(VC) is low). One possibility for mitigating the detrimental effect of increasing the group
size, due to the inability of group members to identify correct solutions, is to separate the
group that generates solutions from a group of experts that choose the best solutions. This
design choice is exhibited in an open innovation platform that uses a group of experts to
choose the winning ideas posed by the crowd [27].
The more the merrier?
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As the world becomes more connected, groups are increasingly able to solve problems
collaboratively by utilizing participants of diverse backgrounds and expertise [28–30]. This
study improves our understanding of the mechanisms that underlie group problem-solving
processes, and can inform the design of systems for helping groups make good decisions
collectively.
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